Revista de Economía Financiera. Número 14 – 1º Cuatrimestre 2008
Titulares de los artículos
Estíbaliz Biedma López y Emiliano Ruiz Barbadillo y Félix J. López Iturriaga y Mauricio Jara Bertín
Factores determinantes de la independencia de la comisión de auditoría
The Law of Reform of the Spanish Financial System (Ley de Medidas de Reforma del Sistema Financiero) in 2002 forced the quoted firms to create an auditing committee from the board of directors. This committee had not been mandatory up to then. Consequently, Spain is an interesting framework to study the reasons for the voluntary creation of auditing committees and the independence of the committee. We analyse the factors determining the independence of the committee and we study to which extent the auditing committee works as a complementary vs. substitutive mechanism of corporate governance. Our results show that the size of the board, the independence of the board and the duality of CEO and president of the board are positively related to the independence of the committee. On the contrary, the managerial ownership affects negatively the independence of the committee. Taken together our results suggest that the auditing committee works simultaneously as a complementary and substitute mechanism.
Jordi Surroca Aguilar y Josep A. Tribó Giné
Influencia de los bancos y cajas como accionistas y acreedores en la manipulación contable de las empresas
In this paper, we study the impact that financial institutions have on a firm’s earnings management, when acting as lenders or owners. Making use of a database of 2844 non-financial Spanish firms for the period 1996-2000, we find that when financial institutions are shareholders, they stimulate earnings management practices in participated firms, especially when these institutions are not lenders. Additionally, when we distinguish between banks and S&L institutions, we find that only the latter institutions stimulate earnings manipulation in participated firms. Finally, we find that any increase in the number of financial institutions as owners hinders earnings manipulation. Hence, a reduction in earnings management, for those firms where by financial institutions have holdings, can be achieved by increasing the number of this type of shareholder, as well as by stimulating their creditor role.
Inmaculada Aguiar Día y Domingo Javier Santana Martín y Nieves Lidia Díaz Díaz
Estructura de propiedad y dividendos en España
The objective of the present study is to test the hypothesis of expropriation derived from the existence of blockholders in the ownership structure of listed Spanish firms. The results allow us to conclude that (i) the relationship between ownership and dividends is affected by the type of decision –distribution or amount-, (ii) the hypothesis of expropriation holds for the concentration of voting rights as well as for the level of divergence between voting and cash flow rights, in both assumptions for different levels of concentration and divergence, (iii) family firms use the amount of dividends as an expropriation mechanism. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that expropriation takes place for certain voting rights and divergence levels. Finally, we conclude, that companies use two mechanisms to extract rents: to avoid the distribution of dividends and/or to reduce the amount of such dividends, depending both on the level of control of the main shareholder.
Paula A. Cohen y Miguel A. García Cestona
La empresa, el capital social y el capital humano bajo contratos incompletos
The ownership of physical assets has been used as a mechanism to solve both coordination and motivation problems inside the firm. It has also been used to explain the boundaries of the firm. Recent studies show that human assets have increased their importance respect to physical assets. This new scheme generates new queries about ownership, boundaries of the firm and the relationship between shareholders and workers. We include the social capital concept and the possibility that shareholders give power to the employees in order to motivate them to generate more investments in human capital. We develop a basic model of investments which includes social capital investments and the existence of workers who invest in specific human capital but also those workers who invest in general human capital. This facilitates the creation of additional human capital and higher levels of individual productivity. Higher total productivity and additional wealth follow.